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Abstract 
A tax shifting from labour income to housing taxation is generally advocated on 
efficiency grounds. However, most of the empirical literature focuses on the distributional 
implications of property tax reforms without paying much attention to potential consequences on 
the labour market. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap by investigating the effects of a tax 
shifting from labour income to property, guaranteeing revenue neutrality, and to assess the 
consequences of labour market equilibrium, both on occupation rates and income distribution. 
We propose to consider a hypothetical tax reform in Italy which uses the revenue of the tax on 
house property (actually implemented in 2012) for increasing tax credits on low incomes and 
making them refundable. In order to evaluate the reform we have developed a structural model of 
household labour supply which takes into account the labour market equilibrium conditions. 
Overall, the simulated policy provides a more effective income support and better incentives to 
work for low wage households and determines an improvement in inequality indexes. 
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1. Introduction 
In the context of the financial and economic crisis governments are confronted with the need of 
consolidating their public finances but also of devising policy interventions aimed at fostering 
economic recovery and growth, taking into account equity concerns. 
A general consensus seems to be reached on some general points. First, looking for tax bases less 
detrimental to growth, it looks reasonable to lower the tax burden on labour income. Second, 
distributional concerns are raised with respect to the protection of the most vulnerable groups of 
population, already severely hit by the crisis. At the same time, low-earners often face high 
implicit effective marginal tax rates due to the presence of means-tested benefits or non 
refundable tax relief schemes. Such provisions imply a very high tax burden on the additional 
earnings that a low-earner could try to get with strong disincentives on their labour supply.  
It is here that the tax shifting from labour income to property comes into the picture. Property 
taxation is recognized as a form of taxation capable of raising tax revenues while being less 
harmful to economic efficiency and equity in the distribution of resources (European 
Commission, 2012; OECD, 2009; Mirrlees et al., 2011; IMF, 2013). Furthermore, the additional 
revenue obtained by a reform of the property taxation, if used to reduce the fiscal burden on low 
earners, could enhance both the efficiency and the equity of the fiscal system.  
However, although a tax shifting to housing taxation is generally advocated on efficiency and 
redistributive grounds (Arnold et al., 2011; Norregaard, 2013), the existing empirical literature 
does not pay much attention to the potential consequences on the labour market that in turn also 
affect income distribution. The novelty of this paper is to fill this gap and to assess the 
consequences of the labour market equilibrium - both on occupation rates and income 
distribution - which could emerge as a result of a tax reform that shifts the tax burden from 
labour income to property, guaranteeing revenue neutrality. 
In order to evaluate such a reform we have developed a structural model of household labour 
supply which takes into account the labour market equilibrium conditions. The analysis adds to 
the literature on ex ante evaluation of policy reforms as it simultaneously: a) encompasses a 
multisectorial perspective in order to better capture the heterogeneity in the workers population; 
b) adopts a modelling framework fully consistent with comparative static analysis considering 
the labour market equilibrium conditions; c) allows for revenue neutrality of the policy proposed. 
First we estimate the individual labour supply through a multi-sector discrete choice model: we 
build on Dagsvik and Strom (2006),  Dagsvik et al. (2009) and Aaberge and Colombino (2013) 
by allowing individuals to choose, beside the hours of work (not working, part-time, full-time, 
extra-time) also, for the first time in the literature, the occupation (employment and self-
employment). Second, we account for market equilibrium conditions. Creedy and Duncan (2005) 
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and Peichl and Siegloch (2012) complement a discrete choice model of labour supply by a model 
of labour demand. The procedure adopted there, however, would not be consistent with a 
matching model (as the one we adopt) that simultaneously includes a representation of both 
labour supply and labour demand. Here, therefore, we follow Colombino (2013), and adopt a 
procedure that is specifically appropriate for the estimated model and permits a consistent 
comparative static evaluation of pre- and post-reform equilibrium. Moreover, the parameters of 
the tax policies are calibrated in order to assure that the amount of net total tax revenues are 
equal to the pre-reform setting (fiscal neutrality). 
We propose to consider a hypothetical tax reform in Italy, a country characterized by a relatively 
high tax burden on labour income, the absence of any generalized form of income support for the 
poorest and a renewed policy interest for property taxation (Longobardi, 2013). In particular, we 
simulate the new regime of property taxation as introduced in Italy in 2012. The new local 
property tax (i.e. IMU) applies different tax rates on the imputed value of both the main 
residence and other residences, allowing for some tax credits associated with the main residence 
and the presence of children. Focusing on households properties, the new property tax regime 
guarantees an extra tax revenue of about 8.5 billion euro. We do not take into account any 
potential effect on the housing market that could have emerged as a consequence of the new 
local property tax: this is consistent with a quite inelastic housing market in particular in Italy, a 
country characterized by a very low level of mobility. 
In our simulations, such additional revenue is used to lower the personal income tax burden by 
increasing the amount of the existing tax credits for employees and self-employed and making 
them refundable. In this way, individuals with positive labour income can get a negative income 
tax if their tax liability is lower than the amount of the tax credits.  
The results show an increase in the labour supply, in particular among women in couple, which 
contributes to enhance the redistributive effects of the simulated tax policy and to improve the 
overall social welfare. As expected, the labour market equilibrium determines a reduction of the 
positive labour supply effect of the reform which can be quantified in around one third and 
compresses the distributive effects. The results highlight the potential use of revenue of housing 
taxation to reduce the tax burden on labour income and the importance of accounting for second 
round effects in the simulations.  
2. The Italian tax burden on labour and property incomes  
As in the case of most European countries, the Italian tax benefit system is the result of historical 
compromises, designed under a given set of social and economic circumstances. Despite frequent 
periodic adjustments in the tax structure, the changes in the tax system have not provided a more 
competitive fiscal environment and better work incentives in particular for low-income earners. 
Considering both income tax and social insurance contributions, working-age individuals face 
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quite a high levy compared to other European countries and they receive limited support from 
the benefit system. The average tax in Italy is about 10 percentage points higher than the OECD 
average (OECD, 2009), with a one-earner couple with two children facing a tax wedge of 36% 
(compared with an OECD average of 26%) and a lone parent with two children facing a tax 
wedge of 25% (compared with an OECD average of 17%).  
The personal income tax is assessed at the individual level based on a progressive schedule, with 
the marginal tax rate set at 43%. In the absence of any general tax relief (e.g. in the form of a 
personal allowance), tax payers can get a reduction of their tax burden only through non 
refundable personal tax credits related to the income source in addition to a number of tax reliefs 
that depend on the number of dependent persons in the family. Tax credits related to the income 
source constitute a no tax area for employees with an income up to 8000 per year and self-
employed with an income up to 4800 euro per year. Above these thresholds and up to 55,000 
euro per year the tax credits are linearly decreasing in the level of gross income and exhaust 
when income is 55,000 euro per year. However, given that they are non refundable, low-income 
individuals do not receive the full amount of the tax credit if this exceeds the tax liability. 
Overall the existing direct taxes imply a quite low level of progressivity coupled with a relative 
high average tax (Verbist and Figari, 2014). 
In this paper we consider a hypothetical reform that makes the tax credits more generous and 
refundable by using the extra revenue generated by the property tax reform introduced in Italy in 
2012 which is about 8.5 euro billions including only the taxes on dwellings belonging to private 
households. The property tax was first introduced in Italy in 1992 as a municipal tax (ICI, 
Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili) on residential, commercial, and industrial buildings plus 
agricultural and residential land but since 2008 owner-occupied dwellings were exempted from 
the tax. As in the case of 1992, opposition to property tax reform was overcome in the context of 
a financial crisis (Longobardi, 2013) and in 2012 Italy introduced a new property tax (IMU, 
Imposta Municipale Unica) that fundamentally reformed and increased property taxation, 
including the owner-occupied dwellings into the tax base which is represented by the imputed 
values (i.e. the re-evaluated cadastral values) of the dwellings. The basic tax rate was set at 0.76 
per cent but municipalities were permitted to alter the rate within +/- 0.3 percent. The tax rate for 
primary residences was set at 0.4 per cent but municipalities were allowed to alter the rate within 
+/- 0.2 per cent.5 Overall, considering all properties in the country not only those owned by 
private households, the new measures resulted in a significant increase in property tax revenue 
which summed up to 24 euro billions in 2012 with respect to 10 euro billions in 2011. 
Considering the new property tax, the tax revenue from housing properties belonging to private 
households in 2012 was around 10% of tax revenue, a percentage still lower than what observed 
in France or the UK (OECD, 2014). 
                                                 
5 In the simulation, due to lack of information on the municipality of residence the basic tax rate is applied. 
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However, the tax on primary residences has been in place only for one year because it has been 
frozen and then abolished in the 2013. A full review of the housing taxation is again under 
consideration and the new tax will be more similar to a comprehensive service tax, resembling 
the British Council Tax and the French system of a tax foncière and a taxe d’habitation 
(Longobardi, 2013). 
From a policy perspective, in this rather uncertain institutional context, our estimates of the 
distributional effects and potential use of the revenue of the property tax in place in 2012 
represent a useful benchmark for the policy making process.  Currently the Italian government is 
confronted with the Delega Fiscale, a legislative document that considers reforms to the property 
tax among other taxes, calling for an update of cadastral values to reflect market value to achieve 
equity and to strengthen the use of property taxes in local government finance (Keen et al., 
2012).   
3. The empirical modelling 
The modelling framework we adopt in this paper allows us to estimate the incentive effects of a 
policy reform on the labour market and the income distribution, considering two sectors (i.e. 
employment and self-employment), imposing the equilibrium between demand and supply and 
guaranteeing revenue neutrality.  
We build on the most recent literature and we do combine the existing models in an innovative 
way along two dimensions. 
First, with respect to modelling labour supply, following on Dagsvik and Strom (2006), Dagsvik 
et al. (2009) and Aaberge and Colombino (2013), we propose a multisectorial labour supply 
model. For the first time, we include self-employment in the labour supply model and we treat 
employment and self-employment as two separate job sectors. Self-employment has become a 
sort of primary entrance way in the labour market for both young and women (Berton et al., 
2011). Many of these workers do indeed work as dependent workers with a pattern of hourly 
wage resembling the one of employed, but the self-employment contract grants more flexibility 
and lower payrolls, and (because of that) is privileged by entrepreneurs (Mandrone and Marocco, 
2012). 
Second, in order to perform the simulation under equilibrium between labour supply and 
demand, we extend Colombino (2013) to cover the two job sectors and to consider the revenue 
neutrality taking into account the detailed rules of the tax-benefit system integrating the static 
simulation in the equilibrium procedure.  
Overall, the empirical modelling developed in this paper is made up of three main parts, 
described in the following subsections.  
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The first part is the static microsimulation model that converts the household gross income into 
disposable income under "current" and "reformed" tax-benefit rules in order to evaluate the static 
distributive effects of the tax-benefit reform and to define the budget set used in the labour 
supply model.  The second part is a multisectorial labour supply model that is used to estimate 
the preference parameters and the behavioural changes to the tax-benefit reform. The third part 
accounts for the equilibrium between labour supply and demand and for fiscal neutrality. 
3.1 Static microsimulation model 
In this paper we make use of the Italian component of EUROMOD, the European-wide tax-
benefit microsimulation model. EUROMOD is a static microsimulation model. It combines 
detailed information on relevant policy rules with representative data on individual and 
household circumstances drawn from national household income surveys with the aim of 
obtaining a consistent picture of the distribution of the personal income before and after taxes. 
EUROMOD simulates the main social insurance contributions, income taxes and the non 
contributory benefits. Contributory benefits (mainly old age and disability pensions) are not 
simulated due to lack of information about contributory history and health conditions and are 
taken directly from the underlying survey (Sutherland and Figari, 2013). Our simulations are 
based on the Italian component of the 2010 European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC). 
One of the main features of a static microsimulation model is to compute the disposable income 
of individuals and their families under different scenarios, taking into account the tax-benefit 
policies and the way they depend on the level of individual market income and 
personal/household characteristics (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006). Considering the gross 
hourly wage of the decision makers and any other source of income of the family and its 
characteristics, EUROMOD derives the net disposable income of the family corresponding to 
each possible labour market alternative the decision makers can opt for, taking into account the 
whole tax-benefit system.  
The Italian component of EUROMOD reproduces the 2009 Italian tax-benefit system and has 
been validated at micro and macro level comparing the results with the aggregates provided by 
the fiscal authority (Ceriani et al. 2014). EUROMOD has been used to perform the static 
simulation that is presented in Section 5 and used as a benchmark with respect to the behavioural 
simulations presented in Section 6. 
3.2 The multisectorial labour supply model 
We consider couples, i.e. households whose head has a partner, and singles, i.e. household whose 
head is single. The two partners (in couple household) or the single head-of-household are the 
decision-makers in our model. We do not model the behaviour of other persons who might be 
living in the household, i.e. their labour supply choices are treated as exogenous.  Households 
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can choose among jobs characterized by hours of work h, chosen within a feasible set  , sector 
of market job s (if h > 0: s = 1 employment, s = 2 self-employment) and other characteristics 
(non-pecuniary attributes) k (observed by the household but not by us). By including both the 
employed and the self-employed we are able to use a sample that is more representative – than 
usually done – of the overall working-age population. We write the utility function of the i-th 
household as follows: 
 ( ( ' , , ; ), , )i i sU U c h w s I T h k   (1) 
where ( ' , , ; )sc h w s I T  is the net available income given earnings ' sh w , unearned income I, sector 
of employment s and tax-benefit rule T. All details of the tax-benefit system are taken into 
account in the estimation and simulation of the model resorting to EUROMOD. 
Note that h and s are scalars in case of a single, while in case of a couple they are defined as 
follows: 
 ,
F F
M M
h s
h s
h s
   
    
   
 (2)   
where the subscripts F and M refer to the female and the male partner respectively. Analogously, 
the wage rate ws is a scalar in case of a single, while in case of a couple is defined as  
 
F
M
S
s
S
w
w
w
 
   
 
  (3) 
In view of the empirical application, the utility attained by household i on a job of type ( , )h s , 
given the tax-benefit regime T, is assumed to have the form 
 ( ( ' , , ; ), )i s iV c h w s I T h   (4) 
where ( ( ' , , ; ), )i sV c h w s I T h  is the systematic part (containing observed variables) of the utility 
function and i  is a random variable that measures the effect of the optimally chosen 
(unobserved) characteristics k.  
Let ( , )ig h s  denote the number (or the density) of jobs of type ( , )h s  in household i’s opportunity 
set. By assuming that i  is i.i.d. Type I Extreme Value, the probability that household i is 
matched to a job of type ( , )h s , for h > 0, turns out to be6 (e.g. Aaberge et al. 1999):  
                                                 
6 In eq. (5), j and x are summation indices denoting respectively the job sectors and the hours of work of the feasible 
set Ω. 
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 
   
2
1 0,
exp ( ( ' , , ; ), ) ( , )
( , )
exp ( (0,0, ; ),0) exp ( ( ' , , ; ), ) ( , )
i s i
i
i i j i
j x x
V c h w s I T h g h s
P h s
V c I T V c x w j I T x g x j
  

 
          (5) 
  
For h = 0, the probability of not working is obtained from (5) replacing the numerator with
 exp ( (0,0, ; ),0)iV c I T , where (0,0, ; )c I T  is the disposable income due to non-labour income I.  
Once we have estimated the utility function, we can replace T with, say, T’ in expression (5) in 
order to simulate the new choices given a new tax-benefit rule T’. Such a probability accounts 
for the demand side of the market and then for the equilibrium through the density g(h,s) (see 
Colombino, 2013) and can be  interpreted as a Conditional Logit model where the systematic 
utility components are weighted by a measure of  “availability” g(h,s). 
Empirical specification and estimation results 
The choice set    of hours each individual can choose among, is assumed, for each sector s, to 
be represented by three alternative weekly working hours ={ 1 2 3h , h , h }, where  1 2 3h , h , h  are 
random values drawn from the hours interval 1÷26 (part time), 27÷52 (full time),  52÷80 (extra 
time). The not working condition is represented by 0 0h  .  
We estimate the labour supply models of couples and singles separately. In the case of singles 
we have 7 alternatives, while in the case of couple, who make joint labour-supply decision, we 
combine the choice alternatives of two partners, thus getting 49 alternatives. 
When computing the income available on any particular job (h, s) we face the problem that the 
wage rates of sector s are observed only for those who work in sector s. To deal with this issue, 
we estimate sector-gender-specific wage equations to predict hourly wages for the jobs in the 
employment sector and in the self-employment sector adopting a two-stage selection-correction 
procedure consistent with the distributional assumption made for the random utility function 
(Dagsvik and Strøm 2006).  
First, we estimate the parameter-vectors b1 and b2 with the following multinomial logit model, 
where s = 1 if individual i is an employee, s = 2 if individual i is self-employed and s = 0 if 
individual i in not working: 
 
2
1
i s
i s
b
s
b
s
e
P
e



X
X
 (6) 
The vector Xi includes personal characteristics influencing the choice of work:  age, age square, 
education (considering lower, higher and tertiary education), marital status, number of children 
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of different age range (i.e. 0-3, 4-6, 7-10), and a variable including the amount of non labour 
income. 
Then, we estimate by OLS the parameters (on the subsample of individuals that work in sector s 
differentiated by gender) of the logarithm of the hourly wage taking into account the selection 
problem: 
 ln lni ,s i s s i ,s i ,s
ˆw z P u     (7) 
 
The logarithm of the wage rate is assumed to depend linearly on the row vector of variables zi 
including: age, age square, education (considering lower, higher and tertiary education), and the 
unemployment of the region of household residence.  
,
ˆ
i sP  is the probability of being in sector s 
computed on the basis of the estimates 1bˆ  and 2bˆ  obtained from eq. (6)  and works as selection-
correction term.  
Last, we impute to every observation the wages by sector (s), computed as follows: 
 i ,s i s i ,s
ˆˆ ˆw exp( z u )   (8) 
where ui,s is a random draw from the normal term with mean 0 and variance equal to the 
estimated variance of 
,i su . The parameters sb  and s  are gender-specific, i.e. they are estimated 
on the subsamples of females and males. The results of each step are reported in Appendix A. 
In order to specify the systematic part of the utility function we adopt a (linear in parameters) 
quadratic form: 
 ( ( ' , , ; ), ) ( ' , , ; ) ( )i s sV c h w s I T h h w s I T h= Y γ +L λ  (9) 
  
where:  
Y(hws,s,I;T) is a row vector including household disposable income on a job of type (h,s,) given 
the tax-benefit rule T, its square and its interaction with the household size. When h = s = 0 (i.e. 
not working), the net disposable income is given by non-labour income I, if any. 
L(h) is a row vector including the leisure time (defined as the total number of available weekly 
hours (80) minus the hours of work h) for both partners, its square and the interaction with 
household disposable income, age (and age square), presence of children of different age range 
(i.e. >0, 0-6, 7-10), and leisure time of the partner. 
We specify the opportunity density as follows: 
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  ( , ) exp ( , )g h s h s D δ  (10) 
where D(h,s) is a row vector of dummy variables referring to participation, part-time, and full-
time (depending on h belonging to a range of given values) in each sector s and for each partner.  
In the above vectors, turning to the singles, the specification of the utility function and the 
definition of variables are the same as for the couples, but refer to a single individual. 
Given the specifications (9) and (10) and the definitions above, the probability that household i is 
matched to a job of type (h’ws ,s) is:  
  
   
2
1 0,
exp ( ' , , ; ) ( ) ( , )
( , )
exp (0,0, ; ) (0) (0,0) exp ( ' , , ; ) ( ) ( , )
i s i i
i
i i i i j i i
j x x
h w s I T h h s
P h s
I T x w j I T x x j
  


   
Y γ +L λ D δ
Y γ +L λ D δ Y γ +L λ D δ
     (11) 
 
In identifying the decision-makers, we adopted the following criterion. We select all the 
individuals in the age range 18-59 not retired or disabled. Among them, for each household, we 
then select the oldest individual either if he/she is a single or if he/she cohabits with a partner in 
the same age range and is neither disabled nor retired. In this way, we end up with a sample of 
decision makers made up of 6,282 couples and 6,067 singles (3,273 males and 2,794 females). 
Together with their relatives, these individuals represent almost 68 per cent of the overall 
population, a larger share of population than usually accounted for in labour supply analysis, due 
to the inclusion of self-employed workers and individuals living with other “non-decision 
makers" whose labour supply is considered as exogenous. 
By construction, the decision-makers are relatively young: the average age among couples is 44 
for men and 41 for women, while for singles is about 37. The inactivity rates are however quite 
high with respect to other European countries, especially among women. Indeed the inactivity 
condition characterizes the 6 per cent of men in couple, the 15 per cent of single men, the 23 per 
cent of single women and the 37 per cent of women in couple (Table 1).  Among workers, self-
employment is quite widespread. The incidence of self-employed work ranges between 11 per 
cent and 25 per cent confirming a pattern that marks the Italian job market. Part-time positions 
are instead limited, they involve only a small percentage of women in dependent work. The 
average male dependent worker works about 40-41 hours per week versus the 44-47 hours of 
self-employed, while among women the average hours of work per week become 34-37 if 
employee and 40-42 if self-employed.  
 
 
 
11 
 
Table 1 - Occupational status and hours of work of decision makers 
 
Source: our elaborations. 
The parameters’ estimates for couples and singles are reported in Tables B.1 and B.2 of 
Appendix B. They determine the marginal utility of income  and leisure taking into account the 
preference heterogeneity captured by the demographic characteristics (age and number of 
children grouped by their age) and the opportunity density parameters. As expected from the 
economic theory, the coefficients of income and its square indicate increasing and diminishing 
marginal utility of income. The coefficients of leisure indicate increasing marginal utility of time 
spent not in work (diminishing as hours of leisure increase for women in couple and single). On 
average, households value disposable income and leisure positively. 
3.3 The equilibrium model  
In order to account for market equilibrium conditions we follow Colombino (2013), and adopt a 
procedure that is specifically appropriate for the estimated model: the labour market equilibrium 
comes through the adjustment of the coefficients of participation dummies (i.e. ( , )h sD ) that take 
into account the demand of employee and of self-employed workers. 
Previous attempts to incorporate equilibrium conditions in a discrete choice model setting are 
found in Creedy and Duncan (2005) and Peichl and Siegloch (2012) who complement a discrete 
choice model of labour supply by a model of labour demand. The procedure adopted there, 
however, would not be consistent with a matching model (as the one we adopt) that 
simultaneously includes a representation of both labour supply and labour demand.  
In our setting, as a response to the change in tax-transfer policy regime, the number of people 
willing to work as employee and self-employed changes and the demand for these positions has 
to vary accordingly. Indeed, by assumption, the mutual consistency of agents' choices implies 
that the number of the available jobs be equal to the number of workers willing to be matched to 
these jobs. After the tax policy reform, the equilibrium between the demand and the supply in the 
two markets is reached through an adjustment of wages. As the average wages for employee and 
self-employed change, the estimated coefficients of the participation dummies in the estimated 
labour supply model change and so does the labour supply.  
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Inactive 6% 37% 15% 23% 0 0 0 0
Employee 69% 52% 63% 63% 40.9 34.2 40 36.7
Self-employed 25% 11% 22% 14% 46.6 39.9 44.4 41.7
Occupational status (%) Average hours of work per week
Couples Single Couples Single
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For simplicity, let us assume that ( , )h sD contains only the two dummies for market jobs in sector 
s.7 Colombino (2013) shows that, under certain assumptions, the coefficients of the dummies 
sδ
can be given the following interpretation: 
 ln ss
s
J
H
δ  (12) 
where s is the sector of market job, Js is the number of available market jobs in sector s 
(employee and self-employed) and Hs is a constant. In equilibrium the number of available 
market jobs must be equal to number of households willing to be matched to those jobs. If we 
model the number of available market jobs as a function of the average wage rates sw , the wage 
elasticity of the demand   and the constants Ks, 
 
s s sJ K w
   (13) 
we get   
ln lns s ss
s s
J K w
H H

 δ           (14) 
Given the observed values of sJ  and sw , the estimated sδ and the imputed value of  , we can 
retrieve the constants sH  and .sK  The equilibrium procedure consists of iteratively finding the 
average wage rate that equates the number of available jobs (determined by equation (13)) to the 
expected number of households willing to be matched to those jobs (determined through 
expressions (11) and (14) ). 
The wage elasticity of the demand   is set at −0.5, which is the predicted benchmark value for 
Southern European countries based on a recent meta-regression analysis on own-wage 
elasticities of labor demand for European countries (Licther et al., 2013). 
The revenue neutrality  
In order to assure that the amount of total revenues will be equal to the pre-reform setting, we 
iterate the labour market equilibrium procedure and change the policy parameters in order to 
reach both equilibria simultaneously.  
The public budget constraint (PBC) is calculated on the overall population as 
 i i iPBC Taxes -Benefits wght i
i h,s
( h' w,s,I ) ( h' w,s,I ) P( h,s )                          (15) 
                                                 
7 For the treatment of more general cases see Colombino (2013). 
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where i is individual, h’w is labour income and s is the sector, I is non labour income. The 
observations are weighted by wght to report aggregates to the population levels. 
We impose the PBC post-reform (under fiscal rules T’) qual to the PBC pre-reform (under fiscal 
rules T): 
 
 by modifying the parameters that raises the current personal income tax credits for employee 
and self-employed. In such a way, the resources redistributed to low earner individuals, 
considering the behavioural reactions of the working age population, are obtained by the new 
property tax paid by households on their main and other residences without generating additional 
public deficit. 
3.4 An overview of the empirical model 
To sum up, the iteration algorithm to get equilibrium between supply and demand − respectively 
for employment and self-employment sectors − and guaranteeing revenue neutrality involves the 
following steps: 
1) run the static microsimulation model (EUROMOD) to get the disposable income 
associated to each possible working alternative the individuals face under the current 
fiscal system (T) and determine the mean wages for each sector ( sw ); 
2) run the labour supply model to estimate the preference parameters of couples and singles 
and the coefficients of the participation dummies sδ  that allow to retrieve the parameters 
H and K in equation (14) used to account for the demand side effects of the reforms; 
3) run the static microsimulation model (EUROMOD) to get the disposable income 
associated to each possible working alternative the individuals face under the reformed 
fiscal system (T’); 
4) simulate the labour supply reactions to the change in disposable income (derived at step 
3)) by applying the preference parameters estimated at step 2);  
5) modify the coefficients of the participation dummies sδ  (equation 12) according to the 
variation in the average sector-specific wage to grant the equality between the demand 
and the supply of workers; all other estimated coefficients (obtained in step 2) remain 
constant; 
6) compute the adjustments in the policy parameters in order to get the revenue neutrality.  
7) repeat steps 3 up to 6 iteratively till reaching contemporaneously the equilibrium in the 
labour market and the revenue neutrality. 
T TPBC PBC '
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4. Labour supply elasticities 
The proposed policy reform affects disposable income of the individuals and, consequently, the 
labour market choices (type of work and hours of work) of the ones of them whose labour supply 
is modelled, i.e. the decision-makers (see Section 3.2). In order to provide a synthetic illustration 
of the behavioural implications of the model estimates as reported in Appendix B, in Table 2 we 
present the elasticity of participation (the percentage change in the participation rate over the 
percentage change in the gross wage rate) and the total elasticity of hours (the percentage change 
in total hours worked over the percentage change in the gross wage rate). The difference between 
total elasticity of hours and elasticity of participation gives the elasticity at the intensive margin 
(i.e. the percentage change in hours worked by those at work). 
The elasticities have been computed by applying a 1 per cent increase in the gross wages (of 
employee and self-employed respectively) of each individual, simulating the individual 
responses and then aggregating them into average values by marital status and gender. 
Table 2 - Unconditional elasticities 
 
Note: Elasticities calculated numerically as the responses to a 1% uniform increase in gross 
wages. Source: our elaborations. 
 
The estimated labour supply elasticities of participation are rather low for men (0.05 if in couple 
and 0.06 if single) and much higher for women (0.25 if in couple and 0.19 if single). The average 
total elasticities of hours of work do not differ substantially from the ones computed on 
participation, revealing that most of the labour supply responses are found at the extensive 
margin. Table 2 also reveals that cross-elasticities, although smaller than direct ones, are 
somehow relevant in the case of women. In particular, on average they are positive revealing a 
pattern of complementarity, with an increase in the male partner’s wage determining an increase 
in female working hours, already found in the literature with respect to Italy. This 
complementarity pattern supports the importance of modeling joint household decision.  
 
The above values reported for individuals in couple are in line with the ones found in the recent 
literature (e.g. Bargain et al., 2014 based on 1995 data) while those for singles are more difficult 
to compare given the selection criteria used in the different studies and the evolution of such 
demographic groups over time. 
 
Men Women
Direct Cross Direct Cross Direct Direct
Elasticity of participation 0.049 0.001 0.251 0.046 0.062 0.188
Total elasticity of hours of work 0.071 0.002 0.283 0.056 0.071 0.209
Couples Single
Men Women
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5. Tax shifting: a hypothetical reform 
Using the extra revenue of the property tax introduced in 2012 (as explained in section 2) we 
propose to make the existing tax credits on employment and self-employment income more 
generous and refundable, resembling the provision of in-work benefits currently in place in most 
of the European countries and in the US (Immervoll and Pearson, 2009). We start with 
multiplying the current tax credits by a factor (alfa = 2.1) that guarantees revenue neutrality in a 
static scenario. Under this simulation scenario, employees get up to 3864 euro if their annual 
taxable income is up to 8000 euro; between 8000 and 15000 the new tax credit is phased out at 
20 per cent (i.e. every additional euro gained the credit is reduced by 0.2); above 15000 per year 
nothing changes with respect to the baseline scenario and the tax credit is decreasing with 
taxable income. Self-employed workers get up to 2318 euro if their annual taxable income is 
below 8000 euro, reduced with a taper rate equal to 20 per cent up to 12000 euro per year, and 
nothing changes with respect to the baseline scenario if taxable income is above 12000 euro per 
year (see Table 3 for details). 
Table 3 - Tax credits for employees and self-employed under current and hypothetical tax 
system 
 
Note. In the current scenario, the tax credit corresponds to the threshold multiplied by the lowest 
marginal tax rate (i.e. 8000*23% for the employee and 4800*23% for the self-employed) and 
guarantees a no-tax area for those with employment or self-employment income equal to the 
threshold. In the proposed new scenario, initially the factor alfa is set equal to 2.1 in order to 
guarantee revenue neutrality in a static scenario. The factor alfa is then calibrated in order to 
guarantee revenue neutrality under labour market equilibrium. Source: our elaboration. 
Current tax credit Proposed new tax credit
Non refundable, € per year Refundable, € per year
 1840 if taxable income<=8000€ alfa*1840 if taxable income <=8000€
Reduced with a taper rate equal to 20%
with taxable income between 8000€ and
15.000€
 
 Decreasing with taxable income between
15000€ and 55.000€
Decreasing with taxable income
between 8000€ and  55.000€
1104 if taxable income<=4800€ alfa*1104 if taxable income <=8000€
Reduced with a taper rate equal to 20% with
taxable income between 8000€ and 12.000€
Decreasing with taxable income
between 4800€ and  55.000€
Decreasing with taxable income between
12000€ and 55.000€
Employee
Self-employed
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For gross labour income from employment below 25000 euro per year (horizontal axis), Figure 1 
shows the net income after personal income tax under the current tax regime (solid line) and the 
new reformed scenario regime (dashed line), where it is clear the additional income provided 
through the new refundable tax credit. In particular, employees with a current theoretical (non 
refundable) tax credit of 1840 euro per year in our simulation receive 3560 per year as tax credit, 
in the form of negative income tax if their tax liability is lower than the tax credit entitlement. 
 
Figure 1. After tax income under current tax system and reformed scenario, employee  
 
Source: our simulations on gross labour income, assumed to be the only income source of a 
hypothetical individual. Family and expenditures related tax credits not considered. 
 
Table 4 reports the static redistributive effects of such a reform on the overall population. The 
tax shifting from labour income to property is expected to have distributional consequences on 
the overall population due to the widespread homeownership rates (almost 70 per cent of Italian 
families own the main residence (Figari et al. 2012), while secondary dwellings often belong to 
individuals in the top part of the income distribution) and the tax relief attributed to individuals 
with low labour incomes. 
 
The introduction of the new property tax (Column a) is responsible for a reduction of disposable 
income in all decile groups. The reduction is about 1.3% in the first decile (due to the relatively 
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higher tax burden for the owners characterized by low liquidity), 1% in the second decile and 
then goes up progressively up to 1.63% in the tenth decile. 
Once the extra revenue is used to provide low income earners with the new tax credit (Column 
b), disposable income increases by 8 per cent in the first decile. Positive increases are found for 
individuals up to the seventh decile, while richer deciles witness a reduction in their disposable 
income up to 1.5 per cent. 
 
Table 4 – Static redistributive effects of tax shifting by decile group 
 
Note: Static redistributive effects computed on overall population without taking into account 
any behavioural reaction. Decile groups defined on the basis of equivalent disposable income in 
the pre-reform scenario. Source: our elaborations. 
6. The labour market equilibrium effects of tax shifting  
The proposed policy change affects the disposable income of our population and consequently 
their supply of work both at the intensive and the extensive margins. In the following we report  
the changes in the occupational status, hours of work and disposable income taking into account 
labour supply and equilibrium effects separately.  
The different steps outlined above have been iterated recursively in order to find the average 
wages and the tax policy parameters that lead simultaneously to the equilibrium between the 
demand and the supply of market jobs and the revenue neutrality of the proposed policy.  
In order to restore the equilibrium between the demand and the supply of market jobs and the 
revenue neutrality, the average wage for employees and self-employed has to change of about     
-0.51 per cent and -1.11 per cent respectively. These results for employee and self-employed 
Property tax Property tax and new tax credits
(a) (b)
1 -1.32 7.62
2 -0.92 1.92
3 -0.79 1.79
4 -0.91 1.7
5 -1.06 1.06
6 -1.06 0.85
7 -1.09 0.21
8 -1.12 -0.21
9 -1.2 -0.64
10 -1.67 -1.51
Decile groups Percentage change of average equivalent disposable income due to
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support the inclusion in our model of self-employed sector, which in the past was usually 
considered not responding to wage variations. Furthermore, the multiplicative parameter "alfa" 
of the tax credits used in a static scenario for guaranteeing revenue neutrality, decreases from 2.1 
to 1.9545 in the equilibrium scenario.  
 
Table 5 shows the variations in the occupational status of individuals and in hours of work that 
follow the introduction of the reform taking into account the labour supply reactions and 
equilibrium conditions. Inactivity rates are expected to decrease among women of about 3 per 
cent and among men of about 2 per cent. In the wake of this, the number of employees is 
expected to increase for both men and women. However, the increase in dependent work among 
men partially depends also on the simultaneous shift of some self-employed to dependent work. 
Under labour market equilibrium (which implies overall revenue neutrality as well), the overall 
increase in the labour supply is reduced by around 30 per cent for women and single men, with a 
larger contraction for men in couples of about 50 per cent.  
The variation in the number of hours of work is due to the joint effect of extensive and intensive 
margins changes in and to the change in the proportions of employees and self-employed. It turns 
out that the expected hours of work by the employees increase for both men and women, while 
they decrease for self-employed men. 
Table 5. Change in the occupational status and in the hours of work by marital status, 
gender and sector.   
 
Notes: Percentage variations computed within the same category. Source: our elaborations on 
sample of decision makers and those belonging to their households.   
 
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Inactive -1.59 -2.56 -0.97 -3.02 -0.76 -1.69 -0.69 -1.95
Employee 0.18 1.2 0.28 0.5 0.16 0.68 0.19 0.24
Self-employed-0.13 2.98 -0.16 2.61 -0.28 2.48 -0.07 2.07
Employee 0.07 0.52 0.2 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.11 -0.19
Self-employed-0.19 2.37 -0.22 2.14 -0.36 1.87 -0.14 1.62
Total 0 0.88 0.08 0.43 -0.05 0.43 0.05 0.17
Changes of labour market status (%)
Variation of hours worked (%)
Labour supply model Equilibrium model
Couples Single Couples Single
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The proposed tax policy reform mainly affects low income groups and women. Table 6 shows 
the expected variations in the supply of work by income deciles. Among married women in the 
first income decile, the supply of work increases of about +3.42 per cent. Among single women 
and men of the same income group, it increases of about +2.01 per cent and about +0.87 per cent 
respectively. 
Married women are the most reactive group, both because of their high labour supply elasticity 
and because they are more likely to be entitled to the new generous tax credit – their earnings 
being on average lower than men’s. Although remaining positive, the increase in their labour 
supply rapidly diminishes for the upper income decile groups till reaching values lower than 1 
percentage point from the 5th income decile group on. Men in couples and singles (both men and 
women) face a positive change in the supply of hours of work in the first two decile groups and a 
negative – although small – change in the middle of the distribution, where the disincentive at 
the intensive margin due to the generosity of the tax credit seems to prevail. 
Under labour market equilibrium and revenue neutrality, the direction of the variations in labour 
supply is confirmed for all individual by marital status and decile groups, although the negative 
variation in the middle of the distribution is reinforced mainly due to the compression of the 
wage rate. 
 
Table 6. Percentage variation in hours of work by marital status, gender and income decile 
 
Source: our elaborations on sample of decision makers and those belonging to their households.   
In the following Table 7 we consider the redistributive effects of the tax shifting under a static 
scenario and then taking into account labour supply and equilibrium effects respectively. 
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
1 0.13 3.42 0.87 2.01 0.07 2.61 0.64 1.30
2 0.03 2.70 0.14 0.20 -0.04 1.86 0.03 -0.17
3 -0.04 2.00 -0.02 -0.11 -0.09 1.26 -0.10 -0.31
4 -0.03 1.21 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 0.64 -0.07 -0.15
5 -0.01 0.97 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 0.45 -0.05 -0.13
6 -0.02 0.70 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.27 -0.03 -0.09
7 -0.01 0.57 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.19 -0.03 -0.08
8 -0.01 0.21 -0.01 0.12 -0.05 -0.12 -0.01 0.06
9 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.09 -0.03 -0.18 0.01 0.04
10 0.03 -0.06 0.05 0.09 -0.04 -0.27 0.07 0.08
Decile 
groups
Labour supply model Equilibrium model
Couples Single Couples Single
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Without considering any behavioral reaction, individuals in the first decile group face a 
substantial increase in their disposable income, due to the generosity of the tax credit to which 
they are entitled to: individuals in couple face an increase of around 7 per cent, single men of 
more than 10 per cent and single women of around 9 per cent. Overall, the redistribution implied 
by the tax shifting from labour income to property make individuals experience positive changes 
in the bottom half of the income distribution, while those in the upper decile groups experience a 
lost in their disposable income up to 1 per cent.  
The labour supply responses lead to an additional increase in the household equivalent 
disposable income for all individuals at the bottom of the distribution, while the disincentive 
effect at the intensive margin observed above, determines small negative changes in income for 
single men and women in the middle and upper part of the income distribution. 
Once we account for the equilibrium effects and the fiscal neutrality, the increase in the 
household disposable income at the bottom of the income distribution results to be lower than in 
the static scenario but it is still relevant, with changes due to the overall tax shifting reform larger 
than 6 per cent for the individual in the poorest decile groups. 
Table 7. Redistributive effects. Percentage variation in the household disposable income in 
different models by marital status, gender and income decile 
 
Note: Redistributive effects computed on sample of decision makers and those belonging to their 
households. Decile groups defined on the basis of equivalised disposable income in the pre-
reform scenario (weighted by probabilities associated to each working alternative). Source: our 
elaborations. 
The reform is responsible for a slight increase in the average disposable income in the static 
scenario and considering the labour supply reactions, due to the redistribution implied from 
home-owners (and in particular pensioners) to low earner workers. At the same time, it induces a 
Static
Couple Couple Couple
Men Women Men Women Men Women
1 7.47 10.49 8.60 8.66 11.43 10.56 6.00 7.97 6.99
2 3.77 4.69 2.70 4.51 4.94 2.78 2.42 2.46 0.67
3 2.10 1.88 2.11 2.58 1.93 1.95 0.89 0.17 0.39
4 1.24 0.82 0.40 1.53 0.81 0.33 0.12 -0.67 -0.72
5 1.00 0.50 0.61 1.22 0.49 0.54 -0.06 -0.61 -0.39
6 0.48 -0.09 -0.34 0.63 -0.10 -0.37 -0.51 -0.86 -1.18
7 0.17 -0.36 -0.54 0.26 -0.37 -0.58 -0.73 -1.12 -1.27
8 -0.01 -0.36 -0.56 0.03 -0.36 -0.53 -0.90 -1.01 -1.12
9 -0.51 -0.77 -0.88 -0.49 -0.76 -0.82 -1.31 -1.31 -1.34
10 -1.16 -1.23 -1.49 -1.16 -1.19 -1.41 -1.86 -1.66 -1.79
Decile 
groups
Labour Supply model Equilibrium model
Single Single Single
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slight reduction in the average household disposable income when the equilibrium is taken into 
account due to the reduction in average wage which is not fully compensated by the positive 
labour supply reactions (Table 8). Notwithstanding, the overall income distribution appears more 
equal with a substantial reduction of the Gini index of around one percentage point, moving from 
0.25 in the pre reform scenario to 0.24 after the reform. 
 
Table 8. Average household disposable income and income inequality  
 
Source: our elaborations on sample of decision makers and those belonging to their households. 
7. Conclusions 
We have considered a hypothetical tax shifting reform in Italy, using the revenue of the tax on 
house property (IMU, actually implemented in 2012) for increasing tax credits on low incomes 
and making them refundable. Refundable tax credits in fact introduce a negative income which is 
expected to provide a more effective income support and at the same time give better incentives 
to work for low wage households.  
Leaving aside potential effects on housing markets which are anyway assumed to be limited in a 
country like Italy characterized by an inelastic housing market and very low mobility, in order to 
evaluate the reform we developed a multisectorial structural model of household labour supply 
which takes into account the labour market equilibrium conditions and ensures fiscal neutrality. 
The analysis adds to the existing literature on ex ante evaluation of policy reforms as it 
simultaneously: a) encompasses a multisectorial perspective in order to better capture the 
heterogeneity in the workers population; b) adopts a modelling framework fully consistent with 
comparative static analysis considering the labour market equilibrium conditions; c) allows for 
revenue neutrality of the proposed policy, by means of integrating the detailed simulation of the 
tax-benefit system at each step of the programming. 
The simulations confirm the expectations. Namely, there is an increase in employment and 
available income, especially for households in the lowest income deciles, and also an 
improvement in inequality indexes. The equalizing effect of the reform appears to be 
Pre reform
Static Labour supply model Equilibrium model
Couples 1328 1336 1339 1323
Single men 1361 1363 1364 1351
Single women 1051 1060 1063 1049
Gini coefficient 0.246 0.236 0.235 0.238
Post reform
Average equivalent household disposable income (euro per month)
Income inequality
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undisputable. More ambiguous are the efficiency effects: employment and income tend to 
increase (at least in the lowest deciles), but the average income suffers a modest decrease when 
equilibrium is taken into account.  
Nevertheless, some caveats need to be borne in mind in the interpretation of the results. First, the 
equilibrium simulation exercises are conducted under the hypothesis that the elasticity of labour 
demand is equal to -0.5, a somehow prudential assumption based on the estimated average 
elasticity for the Southern European countries, although other values can be tested. Second, a 
more comprehensive normative evaluation procedure should be based on individual and social 
preferences (e.g. Aaberge and Colombino 2013), not just on employment and income. These 
developments are left for future work. 
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Appendix A 
Table A.1 Multinomial logit estimates (equation 6) 
 Male Female 
 employee self-
employed 
employee self-
employed 
age 0.2935***  0.3998*** 0.2488*** 0.3650*** 
 (0.0287)  (0.0358) (0.0260) (0.0455) 
age square  (divided by 100) -0.3204***  -0.4239*** -0.2976*** -0.4247*** 
 (0.0364)  (0.0442) (0.0328) (0.0561) 
lower education 0.6380***  0.7205*** 0.4349*** 0.3856 
 (0.1386)  (0.1656) (0.1300) (0.2158) 
secondary education 0.9274***  1.1417*** 1.3990*** 1.0047*** 
 (0.1359)  (0.1617) (0.1259) (0.2095) 
tertiary education 1.0049***  1.6098*** 2.0085*** 1.9601*** 
 (0.1704)  (0.1933) (0.1410) (0.2226) 
regional unemployment 
(multiplied by  100) 
-0.1840***  -0.1570*** -0.1829*** -0.1423*** 
 (0.0151)  (0.0169) (0.0082) (0.0129) 
couple 0.2157*  0.1744 -0.9092*** -1.0220*** 
 (0.0980)  (0.1102) (0.0764) (0.1056) 
no. children 0-3 -0.4365***  -0.3050* -0.5320*** -0.7854*** 
 (0.1136)  (0.1265) (0.0822) (0.1562) 
no. children 4-6 0.3730*  0.4697** -0.3688*** -0.1627 
 (0.1464)  (0.1547) (0.0781) (0.1208) 
no. children 7-10 0.1699  0.1864 -0.4711*** -0.2780** 
 (0.1076)  (0.1144) (0.0600) (0.0909) 
no labor income ivided  (divided 
by 1000) 
-0.2515***  -0.2032*** -0.0721* 0.0128 
 (0.0374)  (0.0444) (0.0329) (0.0450) 
constant -4.0815***  -8.0593*** -3.3235*** -7.5306*** 
 (0.5616)  (0.7236) (0.5117) (0.9250) 
n. obs. 8689 7393 
LR chi2(22) 750.33 1713.97 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0515 0.1226 
Log likelihood -6915.23 -6135.23 
Notes: Base outcome: not working Standard error in parentheses. Significance level:  * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, and 
*** for p<.001 
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Table A.2. OLS estimates of the wage equation (equation 7). 
 Male Female 
 employee self-
employed 
employee self-
employed 
age         0.0356*** 0.0100 0.0217** -0.0443 
 (0.0058) (0.0336) (0.0068) (0.0344) 
age square (divided by 100) -0.0233** 0.0036 -0.0079 0.0598 
 (0.0071) (0.0362) (0.0085) (0.0406) 
lower education       0.0899*** 0.0733 -0.0293 0.0017 
             (0.0261) (0.0762) (0.0439) (0.1481) 
secondary education      0.3022*** 0.2679** 0.2522*** 0.1468 
             (0.0251) (0.0868) (0.0424) (0.1445) 
tertiary education       0.6197*** 0.5789*** 0.5430*** 0.4848** 
 (0.0287) (0.1182) (0.0446) (0.1708) 
region unemployment  
(multiplied by  100) 
-0.0325*** -0.0484*** -0.0132*** -0.0057 
 (0.0037) (0.0062) (0.0028) (0.0094) 
ln jPˆ        0.1548 -0.7708 0.1724 1.4203 
 (0.3396) (1.9899) (0.1734) (0.9336) 
constant 1.3578*** 2.0448*** 1.5025*** 2.4494*** 
 (0.1739) (0.3396) (0.1521) (0.6203) 
n. obs 5582 1972 3599 716 
F 268.54 34.19 139.88 11.05 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 
R-squared    0.2522 0.1086 0.2142 0.0985 
Adj R-squared 0.2513 0.1054 0.2127 0.0896 
RootMSE 0.4136 0.64852 0.4223 0.70712 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. Significance level:  * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, and *** for p<.001 
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Appendix B 
Tables B.1 and B.2 report the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of equation 11) 
for couples and singles.  
Table B.1 – Conditional Logit estimates – couples 
Model component Variable Coef. Std. Err.
* Opportunity Employee_Male 1.5221 *** 0.4294
density g Self-employed_Male 2.2265 *** 0.4206
Employee_Female -2.69 *** 0.3846
Self-employed_Female -1.416 *** 0.3754
Part-time_Employee_Male -1.795 *** 0.1811
Full-time_Employee_Male 2.3752 *** 0.0997
Part-time_Self-employed _Male -3.516 *** 0.2231
Full-time_Self-employed _Male 0.7659 *** 0.0941
Part-time_Employee_Female 1.2507 *** 0.2162
Full-time_Employee_Female 2.8032 *** 0.2025
Part-time_Self-employed _Female -1.613 *** 0.2139
Full-time_Self-employed _Female 0.6913 *** 0.1762
Y vector Household_Disposable_income (divided by 1000) 1.5468 *** 0.2326
Hosuhold_Disposable_income
2
 (divided by 1e+06) -0.0202 0.0158
Household_size×Household_disposable_income (divided by 1000) -0.1439 *** 0.0233
L vector Leisure_Male 0.1211 *** 0.0321
Leisure_Male
2 
(divided by 1000) 0.2452 0.0002
Leisure_Female 0.2384 *** 0.2122
Leisure_Female
2  
(divided by 1000) -1.0476 *** 0.2514
Leisure_Male×Household_disp_income (divided by 1e+06) 0.5379 1.6834
Leisure_Female×Household_disp_income (divided by 1e+06) -3.2076 ** 1.2426
Leisure_Male×Age_Male -0.005 *** 0.0012
Leisure_Female×Age_Female -0.005 *** 0.0008
Leisure_Male×Age_Male2  (divided by 1000) 0.0590 *** 0.0145
Leisure_Female×Age_Female2  (divided by 1000) 0.0691 *** 0.0101
Leisure_Male×No. Children -0.004 * 0.0017
Leisure_Female×No. Children 0.0036 ** 0.0012
Leisure_Male×No. Children0-6 0.0046 * 0.0022
Leisure_Male×No. Children7-10 -0.002 0.0025
Leisure_Female×No. Children0-6 0.0039 * 0.0015
Leisure_Female×No. Children7-10 0.0044 ** 0.0016
Leisure_Female×No. Leisure_Male 0.0003 *** 0.0001
n. obs. 307818
LR chi2(32)      17486
Prob > chi2      0
Pseudo R2        0.3576
Log likelihood  -15706  
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. Significance level:  * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, and *** for p<.001 
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Table B.2 – Conditional Logit estimates - singles 
Model component Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
* Opportunity 
density g Employee 1.5332 * 0.6376 -4.9141 *** 0.6281
Self_employed 1.8316 ** 0.6267 -3.7570 *** 0.6220
Part-time_Employee -1.9476 *** 0.2541 1.3255 *** 0.2794
Full-time_Employee 2.2396 *** 0.1622 2.7549 *** 0.2527
Part-time_Self-employed -3.3897 *** 0.3005 -1.6785 *** 0.3267
Full-time_Self-employed 0.9586 *** 0.1604 0.7834 *** 0.2303
Y vector Disposable income (divided by 1000) 0.6955 ** 0.2483 1.5778 *** 0.2650
Disposable income
 2 
(divided by 1e+06) -0.0732 * 0.0300 -0.1308 *** 0.0374
Household size×Disp_income (divided by 1000) 0.0923 0.0545 0.0315 0.0504
L vector Leisure 0.2134 *** 0.0303 0.3948 *** 0.0368
Leisure
2 
(divided by 1000) 0.1098 0.3436 -2.3755 *** 0.4007
Leisure×Disposable income (divided by 1e+06) -4.6612 2.6190 -6.5925 ** 2.4874
Leisure×Age -0.0077 *** 0.0008 -0.0077 *** 0.0008
Leisure×Age
2
 (divided by 1000) 0.9373 *** 0.1004 0.9256 *** 0.1068
Leisure×No. Children -0.0063 0.0079 0.0088 ** 0.0029
Leisure×No. Children 0-6 -0.0249 0.0219 0.0041 0.0044
Leisure×No. Children 7-10 -0.0221 0.0187 0.0043 0.0049
n. obs.  22911 19558
LR chi2(17)   4728.03 3776.24
Prob > chi2      0 0
Pseudo R2     0.3712 0.3473
Log likelihood  -4004.95 -3548.75
Male Female 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. Significance level:  * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, and *** for p<.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
